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Abstract 
Recent reforms to the FATF-led international anti-money laundering and terrorist financing 
(AML/CFT) regime install legal professionals as ‘gatekeepers’ by requiring them, among 
others, to take due diligence measures and report suspicious transactions. These reforms have 
generated controversy within the national and international associations of legal 
professionals. This chapter analyses the discourse and policy activities of legal professional 
associations in order to uncover the roots of the discord between legal professionals and 
governments regarding gatekeeping obligations. This chapter shows that underneath the 
official narrative that depicts lawyers’ resistance to gatekeeping as a fight for the preservation 
of liberal democratic values, the institutional priorities and characteristics of the profession 
play the key role in fueling the resistance. The chapter identifies two such institutional factors 
– public image and self-governance concerns of legal professionals – and highlights their 
distinctive implications for the implementation of AML/CFT rules by comparing them with 
contrasting concerns raised by other gatekeeping actors, namely bankers. The chapter 
illustrates that the specific institutional contexts of professional groups influence their 
gatekeeping role. Therefore, regulatory initiatives that enlist the services of professional 
actors need to take seriously and engage the institutional dimension of such actors.  
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Introduction 
A growing trend in global anti-money laundering and counter terrorism 
financing (AML/CFT) governance is the forced enlistment of business entities and 
professional groups as front-line enforcers, or ‘gatekeepers’,1 of the regime. This 
‘responsibilization’2 of businesses and professionals converts those actors into local 
interlocutors of a global regime, a role that manifestly falls outside of their ordinary corporate 
or professional functions.  
The global AML/CFT regime, primarily developed by the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), requires professionals from both financial and non-financial sectors to 
serve as an ‘army of professionals’3 at the frontlines of rule enforcement. Financial 
institutions are defined as legal and natural persons that undertake, as business, one or 
multiple financial activities such as lending, depositing, transferring money, currency 
exchange, trading in money instruments and securities, portfolio management, and issuing 
and managing means of payment.4 Non-financial institutions are businesses and professions 
that do not undertake any of the above-referenced thirteen financial activities as businesses 
but are particularly connected to the mobility of finances. The specific non-financial actors 
designated by the FATF are: casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, dealers in 
precious stones, trust and company service providers, lawyers, notaries, other independent 
legal professionals and accountants.5  
The gatekeeping obligations of these professional actors under the FATF 
regime fall broadly into two types of function: the relatively passive role of conducting due 
diligence; and the role of active cooperation with the state.6 These actors are required to take 
 
1 Shepherd, K. L., ‘Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-based Approach for 
Transactional Lawyers’ (2009) 43 Real Property, Trust & Estate Law Journal 607. On gatekeepers in general, 
see Kraakman, R. H., ‘Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy’ (1986) 2 Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization 53 at p.54. 
2 Garland, D., ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society’, (1996) 
36:4 British Journal of Criminology 445, at pp. 452-455; O’Malley, P. and Palmer, D., ‘Post-Keynesian 
Policing’ (1996) 25(2) Economy and Society 137. 
3 Sahl, J. P., ‘Lawyer Ethics and the Financial Action Task Force: A Call to Action’ (2014) 59 New York Law 
School Law Review 457 at p.476. 
4 For detailed definition, see Glossary of the 2012 FATF Recommendations, at p.117.  
5 Ibid. 
6 The 2012 FATF Recommendations, rec.22–23. 
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due diligence steps before entering into, and throughout the duration of, their engagement 
with a client or customer, including identifying and verifying the client/customer, identifying 
the beneficial (ultimate) ownership of financial transactions, understanding the nature and 
purpose of the business relationship with the client/customer, and continually monitoring this 
relationship.7 The other type of gatekeeper role, where professionals are required to actively 
cooperate with the state, includes obligations of data collection, storage and transfer to the 
state (‘record-keeping obligation’),8 and submission of suspicious activity reports, with the 
accompanying no-tipping off rule (‘reporting obligation’).9 
This chapter discusses how legal professionals perceive and react to their 
gatekeeping obligations, and what consequences for the AML/CFT legal regime flow from 
the nature of their perceptions and reactions. The departure point of this discussion is the 
assertion, further substantiated in the chapter, that there has been fierce resistance to 
gatekeeping duties from the legal profession. This observation invites us to investigate what 
motivation drives the said resistance. The chapter undertakes this investigation by stepping 
into the discursive and institutional elements of the resistance within national and 
international legal professional associations. The analysis deconstructs official legal 
narratives offered by these associations and introduces an alternative institutional factor to 
explain the resistance to gatekeeping. This factor is ‘institutional consciousness’– a term 
developed in this chapter to refer to the prevailing perception and attitude within an organized 
professional group concerning its role and interests. To further amplify the role of 
institutional consciousness in lawyers’ resistance to gatekeeping, contrast will be made with 
another institutional context (the banking sector) where gatekeeping rules have been met with 
a different kind of reaction. This comparison shows how AML/CFT rules are perceived and 
contested differently as they come into contact with various organized professional actors that 
have distinctive consciousness about their profession.  
The first part of the chapter maps the dominant official self-narrative within 
the transnational legal professional community regarding gatekeeping. It shows that lawyers’ 
resistance to gatekeeping is framed as a legal and political struggle for the preservation of 
liberal democratic values. The subsequent section elaborates the concept of institutional 
 
7 Ibid., rec.10. 
8 Ibid., rec.11. 
9 Ibid., rec.20–21. 
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consciousness and deploys it to probe the official narrative of the resistance. In doing so, it 
reveals that the underlying drivers of lawyers’ resistance to gatekeeping, particularly in North 
America where gatekeeping rules are still successfully staved off by lawyers, are institutional 
concerns – namely, concerns regarding the public image and self-governance of the 
profession. The last section will then contrast legal professionals’ response to gatekeeping 
with that of banking professionals. This section will highlight the two diverging sets of 
concerns and perceptions generated by a common gatekeeping regime. It shows how 
institutional consciousness plays a critical role in the implementation of innovative 
AML/CFT initiatives– and how such an ‘across-the-board’ regulatory initiative could 
overlook such institutional nuances of its subjects at some cost to its effectiveness.  
The findings of the chapter are drawn from qualitative textual data from 
organizational archives (particularly those of legal professional associations), academic 
publications by legal professionals, and independent quantitative surveys on institutional 
perceptions. The analysis has a socio-legal approach by combining discourse analysis of texts 
(such as policy documents and meeting records) with legal doctrinal interpretation of 
regulatory instruments. The discourse analysis helps uncover unarticulated (or not officially 
espoused) perceptions and strategic choices within legal professional associations through 
hermeneutical tools, such as analysis of word meanings, analogies, argumentative moves, 
context, and coherence between rhetoric and action. 
Resistance to gatekeeping: the liberal democratic self-narrative 
 
Legal professional associations across the world have generally resisted the 
implementation of the FATF gatekeeping regulations in a more ferocious manner than other 
financial and non-financial professional groups. The resistance has taken the form of 
academic and professional publications,10 policy and advocacy activities by legal professional 
 
10 See Komárek, J., ‘Legal Professional Privilege and the EU's Fight against Money Laundering’ (2008) 27 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 13; Mitsilegas, V. and Vavoula. N., ‘The Evolving EU Anti-Money Laundering Regime: 
Challenges for Fundamental Rights and Rule of Law’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 261.  
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associations,11 and constitutional review legal proceedings.12 The aim was to make the FATF 
reconsider its policy and/or ensure that states do not (fully) implement FATF’s lawyer 
regulation. 
Legal professionals’ resistance to gatekeeping is predominantly framed in 
legal and political terms that are built around liberal democratic premises. The legal argument 
is that gatekeeping obligations are incompatible with widely accepted legal rules related to 
the principle of the independence of the legal profession. Even when these concerns are not 
articulated into self-standing legal rules, the bigger picture of the liberal democratic values at 
stake should render gatekeeping obligations undesirable.  
Legal professionals claim that the gatekeeping obligations threaten legal 
professional privilege (LPP) and, by implication, the administration of justice. Osborne 
argues that the “independence of lawyers and duties owed to citizens [encapsulated in LLP], 
are inherent aspects of a free and democratic society”.13 In states where LPP or the 
independence of the legal profession constitute a self-standing legal norm, such has been 
argued before courts of law. In states where that is not the case, the legal argument is crafted 
by resorting to other legal norms that are said to constitute building blocks or origins of LPP. 
The most common among these norms are the right to fair trial, the rights to privacy, and 
private and family life, and the relationship of fidelity between lawyers and clients.14 The 
legal case against lawyers’ gatekeeping duty is built on the premise that these norms are 
 
11 Shepherd, K. L., ‘The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client Due Diligence: The 
Imperative for Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for U.S. Lawyers’ (2010) Journal of the Professional 
Lawyer 83 at p.87; Osborne, D.E., ‘The Financial Action Task Force and the Legal Profession’ (2015) 60 New 
York Law School Law Review 421. 
12 See Jamaican Bar Association v. The Attorney General and General Legal Counsel [2014] JMSC Civ. 179; 
Nigeria Bar Association v. Attorney General of the Federation & Central Bank of Nigeria, reported in Ahiauzu, 
N., ‘Applicability of anti-money laundering laws to legal practitioners in Nigeria: NBA v. FGN & CBN’ (2016) 
19 Journal of Money Laundering Control 329; Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada [2015] SCC 7, 1 S.C.R. 401 (hereinafter ‘Federation of Law Societies case’).  
13 Osborne (fn 11 above), p. 426. 
14 Mitsilegas, V. and Vavoula. N., ‘The Evolving EU Anti-Money Laundering Regime: Challenges for 
Fundamental Rights and Rule of Law’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 261 at 
p.273. See also, Xanthaki, H., ‘Lawyers' Duties under the Draft EU Money Laundering Directive: Is 
Confidentiality a Thing of the Past?’ (2001) 5 Journal of Money Laundering Control 103 at pp.105–107.  
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fundamental in systems that have any claim to freedom and democracy, and LPP is merely a 
purpose-built repackaging of these norms within professional practice.  
Politically speaking, the independence of the legal profession from the state is 
asserted as a value that should not be superseded by any other policy objective, including the 
need to fight financial crimes. It is argued that the imposition of the gatekeeping role makes 
lawyers ‘insider’ actors within the state’s apparatus and the political system in general, while 
they should have been left ‘outside’ of it.15 Consequently, gatekeeping rules are described as 
universal threats to the independence of the legal profession, which ‘…cannot and should not 
be sacrificed even in the face of a profound and global threat.’16  
Linking LPP and the fundamentals of liberal democracy has been an argument 
commonly deployed by legal professionals before courts of law in different states with 
varying degrees of success. Successful legal challenges of this sort by legal professionals 
have in some states led to the suspension or revocation of national implementation of the 
FATF lawyer regulations.17 The most publicised and consequential among these successful 
litigation approaches was launched by the Federation of Law Societies in Canada, which 
culminated in 2015 in the Federation of Law Societies case.18 Less successful resistance was 
waged in Belgium,19 France,20 and the UK.21  
 
15 Svedberg Helgesson, K. and Mörth, U., ‘Involuntary Public Policy-Making by For-Profit Professionals: 
European Lawyers on Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 1216. 
16 Paton, P. D., ‘Cooperation, co-option or coercion? The FATF lawyer guidance and regulation of the legal 
profession’ (2010) Journal of the Professional Lawyer 165 at p.189.  
17 E.g. Jamaican Bar Association v. The Attorney General and General Legal Counsel [2014] JMSC Civ. 179; 
Nigeria Bar Association v. Attorney General of the Federation & Central Bank of Nigeria, reported in Ahiauzu, 
N., ‘Applicability of anti-money laundering laws to legal practitioners in Nigeria: NBA v. FGN & CBN’ (2016) 
19 Journal of Money Laundering Control 329. 
18 Federation of Law Societies case (fn 12 above). 
19 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others v. Conseil des ministres, European Court of 
Justice, Case C-305/05, Judgment of 26 June 2007. 
20 Michaud v. France, 6 December 2012, ECtHR, App. No. 12323/11. 
21 Bowman v. Fels [2005] EWCA (Civ) 226, paras.41–42. 
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The key argument in most of these cases is that tampering with LPP, 
especially by requiring lawyers to make suspicious transaction reports about their clients, 
disrupts the administration of justice by making clients distrustful of their lawyers (hence no 
fair trial), by violating lawyers’ own right to privacy of correspondence, or generally by 
subtracting from lawyers’ loyalty to their clients.  
However, a broader look at the engagement of legal professional associations 
with governmental gatekeeping initiatives reveals that the core of the resistance to these 
initiatives, particularly in North America, is not primarily driven by legal and political 
concerns. Instead, institutional concerns are at play. These institutional concerns are not 
necessarily self-serving or invalid, but instead intertwine with the legal and political 
concerns. The following section reveals this institutional dimension underneath the official 
narrative of legal and political concerns. 
Resistance to gatekeeping: the institutional dimension  
 
The institutional factor behind legal professionals’ resistance to gatekeeping is 
one of attitude towards the legal regime in question. This shared awareness or perception 
among legal professionals regarding the impact of AML/CFT gatekeeping rules on the 
profession will be referred to henceforth as ‘institutional consciousness’. This consciousness 
is institutional, as opposed to individual or societal, in that its concern is the impact of the law 
on the professional community as an organized group. The concept of institutional 
consciousness draws insights and analogy from the concepts of ‘legal consciousness’ and 
‘legal culture’ developed extensively in the wider law and society literature.22 The essential 
takeaway from these concepts is attentiveness to the study of law’s interaction with social 
cognitive elements such as traditions, opinions, and ways of thinking. In other words, it is 
studying how the law is experienced and interpreted in a particular group; understanding the 
 
22 Friedman, L., ‘Legal Culture and Social Development’ (1969) 4 Law & Society Review 29; Cotterrell, R., 
Living Law: Studies in Legal and Social Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997; Ewick, P., and Silbey, 
S., The Common Place of Law: Stories From Everyday Life, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
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law not according to the dictates of doctrinal rules of interpretation, but according to how 
people think and talk about it.  
The institutional consciousness that animates legal professionals’ resistance to 
gatekeeping pertains to the position and the interest of the profession vis-à-vis the 
disciplining state. In the AML/CFT regime the state has a policing role over regulated 
entities, including the legal profession. This policing role, executed both through punishment 
(including financial penalties) and engagement (such as information sharing), depicts a 
process of discipline, whereby the regulated entities are coerced or conditioned into 
obedience to the state.23 Such a process of discipline creates a power relationship between the 
disciplining state and the regulated entities at the receiving end of discipline.  
 The unarticulated institutional consciousness that animates the resistance to 
gatekeeping is the legal professionals’ need to extricate themselves from the prism of 
disciplinary power relationship between the state and regulated subjects. There arises a need 
to position the profession as neither in alliance with the state nor identifying with the subjects 
of state discipline, but as an outsider watchdog to the disciplinary process. This stance may 
appear identical to the official narrative that lawyers are fighting for professional 
independence as a defence of legal and political ideals of justice and democracy, as discussed 
in the preceding section. The key distinction here is, however, that professional independence 
is sought not (merely) as a pursuit of justice or democracy, but as a projection of group image 
and interests.  
The following discussion substantiates this claim by revealing two specific 
manifestations of group concern underneath the resistance to gatekeeping. These are concerns 
for the (i) public image and (ii) self-regulation of the profession. The analysis is based on a 
qualitative archival study of the preparatory history of the FATF’s guidance document for the 
legal profession on the implementation of FATF Recommendations (the ‘Lawyer Guidance’), 
and on a discourse analysis of legal professional associations’ response to that document. The 
data is gathered from publicly available organizational publications (policy statements, 
 
23 See Roele, I., ‘Disciplinary Power and the UN Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee’ (2013) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 1; Ali, N. T., Regulatory Counter-Terrorism: A critical Appraisal of 
Dynamic Global Governance, New York/London: Routledge, 2018 (chapters 6 & 7). 
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newsletters, press releases), first-hand accounts of meetings by legal professionals, and legal 
instruments between 2007 and 2015.    
Public image of the profession 
 
Legal professionals’ resistance to gatekeeping is driven by a concern for the 
reputational status of the profession. There is a felt need to project an image of the profession 
as an independent guardian of the law, and not a mere subject of the law. The view emanates 
from a consciousness regarding the relative positioning of the profession vis-à-vis other 
professions or businesses – and not necessarily from a normative commitment to the 
positioning of the profession vis-à-vis the state, as officially espoused in the liberal 
democratic argument. The evidence for this proposition comes from observing the nature of 
the issues that were key points of contention between the legal professionals and the FATF.  
During the preparation of the Lawyer Guidance, an important point of 
contention was the very need for the existence of the Guidance. The FATF categorized legal 
professionals in a group of regulated actors known as ‘designated non-financial businesses 
and professions’ (DNFBPs), which, in addition to lawyers and notaries, consists of casinos, 
real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, trust and company service providers, 
and accountants.24 In 2007, the FATF invited all DNFBPs to a series of meetings for the 
preparation of guidance documents on the implementation of FATF Recommendations. 
While all other DNFBPs proceeded to participate, legal professionals put forward demands at 
first, and engaged in substantive talks only in the second round of meetings.25 The main 
demands were that legal professionals be treated separately from the other DNFBPs, and that 
the FATF produce empirical evidence on the AML/CFT vulnerability of lawyers and 
therefore justify the need for regulation.26   
Legal professionals took the very fact of being regulated for AML/CFT 
purposes alongside commercial actors as a shocking offence to the ‘unique role of lawyers’ as 
 
24 Glossary of the 2012 FATF Recommendations, pp.116-124. 
25 Shepherd (fn.1 above), p.629. See same article for detailed history of the legal profession’s engagement with 
the FATF. 
26 Ibid. 
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guardians of freedom and justice.27 The painting of the legal profession with the same brush 
as casinos and banks appeared to reduce the profession to a mere business that provides 
services for a price and in need of watchful government eyes. They argued that lawyers 
‘…and not casinos, serve to protect our citizens’ freedoms and liberties’.28 Representatives of 
the International Bar Association (IBA) and bar associations from North America, Europe, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Hong Kong engaged the FATF with letters and draft 
proposals for a lighter and more trusting treatment of lawyers due to their unique public 
role.29 In response to this demand, the FATF agreed to the preparation of a separate guidance 
for the legal profession, the Lawyer Guidance.30  
In subsequent meetings for the drafting of the Lawyer Guidance, the document 
was also criticized for having the wrong focus: that it aims to suppress bad lawyers, instead 
of empowering good lawyers.31 A system focused on suppressing bad lawyers presumes a 
significant amount of bad lawyers, a claim which lawyers disputed. Duncan Osborne, vice-
president of the International Academy of Estate and Trust Law, who took part in 
consultative meetings between FATF and lawyers, records that during these meetings lawyers 
repeatedly sought to establish that they do not pose an AML/CFT risk.32 The FATF did not 
agree, and lawyers consequently accused the FATF of being not only ‘misguided’ on the 
facts33 but also ‘biased’34 against the interests of the legal profession, driven by ‘wilful 
 
27 Osborne (fn 11 above), p.425; Terrill J.A., and Breslow, M.A., ‘The Role of Lawyers in Combating Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Lessons from the English Approach’ (2015) 60 New York Law School Law 
Review 433 at p.436. 
28 Ibid (Osborne), p.427. 
29 Shepherd (fn 1 above). See also, American Bar Association, American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada, Conseil National des Barreaux, Federation of European Bars, Self-regulatory Organisation 
of Swiss Lawyers and Notaries, Joint Statement by the International Legal Profession on the Fight Against 
Money-Laundering (2003) (http://www.ccbe.org/NTCdocument/signed_statement_0301_1183723072.pdf). 
30 FATF, ‘Risk-Based Approach Guidance for the Legal Profession’, Paris, 23 October 2008. 
31 Osborne (fn 11 above).  
32 Ibid., p.428. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p.423. 
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obliviousness’35 to fact. The fact is, according to lawyers, that there is no empirical evidence 
seriously or systematically implicating legal professionals in financial crimes.36  
Although the involvement of lawyers in criminal finance is the subject of 
controversy and limited research,37 the FATF has produced typologies of actual cases of 
lawyers’ complicity, compiled from various national legal systems, as far back as 2003.38 In 
addition, researchers and national and international regulatory bodies, such as the UK 
National Crime Agency, Europol, and the World Economic Forum, have since produced 
similar evidence.39 Nevertheless, legal professionals insisted that a more extensive typology 
and indisputable evidence on their complicity be brought. They argued that if lawyers are at 
all implicated, it must be through unwitting vulnerabilities, and these can be tackled by 
adopting good practices and guidelines prepared by the professional associations 
themselves.40  
Such documents were subsequently produced by legal professional 
associations. A key illustration is the so-called Lawyer Guide Report adopted by the 
American Bar Association (ABA), the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), 
and the IBA.41 The Report provides guidance to help lawyers avoid violating AML/CFT rules 
unwittingly, showing how to reduce ‘vulnerabilities of the legal profession to misuse by 
 
35 Ibid., p.431. 
36 Zagaris, B., ‘Gatekeepers Initiative: Lawyers and the Bar Ignore It at Their Peril’ (2008) 23 Criminal Justice 
28 at p.32. 
37 Benson K., ‘Money Laundering, Anti-Money Laundering, and the Legal Profession’ in King, C., Walker, C., 
and Gurulé, J., The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism Financing Law, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018, pp.109-133. 
38 FATF, ‘Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2003-2004’, Paris, February 2004, pp 24-27.  
39 Benson (fn 3737 above), pp 112-113; Schneider, S., ‘Testing the Limits of Solicitor‐Client Privilege’ (2006) 9 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 27; He, P., ‘Lawyers, Notaries, Accountants and Money Laundering’ 
(2006) 9 Journal of Money Laundering Control 62; Cummings, L. P. and Stepnowsky, P. T., ‘My Brother's 
Keeper: An Empirical Study of Attorney Facilitation of Money Laundering through Commercial Transactions’ 
(2011) Professional Lawyer 1; Middleton, D., and Levi, M., ‘Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Organized Crime, 
Lawyers and the Regulation of Legal Services’ (2015) 55 British Journal of Criminology 647. 
40 The International Bar Association, American Bar Association, and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe, ‘A Lawyers Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering’, October 2014; Osborne 2015 (fn 
11 above), p.425. 
41 The International Bar Association, American Bar Association, and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe, ‘A Lawyers Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering’, October 2014. 
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criminals’.42 Such guidance is claimed to be ‘…sufficient to help lawyers avoid unwitting 
assistance to unlawful activities…’.43 Underlying these moves is an assertion that because 
lawyers are self-driven guardians of the public interest, all that is needed is to enlighten them 
to the traps of dirty money, so they will not stumble into them.  
 
Self-regulation of the profession 
 
The resistance to gatekeeping obligations is fiercest in the United States and 
Canada, where legal professional associations have been able to block the countries’ 
compliance with FATF standards. These two countries are repeatedly criticised for failing to 
implement customer identification, record keeping, suspicious transaction reporting, and no-
tipping off obligations on the legal profession, and for failing to supervise the profession.44 
Canada has been particularly subjected to FATF’s ‘follow-up’ procedure, a monitoring step 
triggered before severe countermeasures could be invoked for non-compliance.45  
A survey of the policy documents and discourse of legal professional 
associations in these two countries reveals that the resistance to gatekeeping is also driven by 
a perceived threat to the self-regulation of the profession – hence it relates not just to what is 
being required but also to who is requiring it. This is evidenced by the fact that these 
associations, while resisting national implementation of FATF rules, adopted more or less 
similar AML/CFT standards into their self-governance documents.  
In Canada, the Federation of Law Societies of Canada, which, together with 
the Canada Bar Association, launched the constitutionality challenge against Canada’s 
implementation of lawyers’ gatekeeping under the Proceeds of Crime Act,46 later adopted 
 
42 Ibid., p.24. 
43 Osborne (fn 11 above), p.425. 
44 See FATF, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures – United States Fourth Round 
Mutual Evaluation Report, (December 2016), Third Round Mutual Evaluation Report, (June 2006), Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures – Canada Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report, 
(September 2016), Third Round Mutual Evaluation Report, (February 2008), all available at <www.fatf-
gafi.org>.  
45 FATF, ‘Mutual Evaluation of Canada – 6th Follow-Up Report’ (2014). 
46 Federation of Law Societies case (fn 12 above). 
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internal rules which ‘…apart from mandatory secret reports on client activities, effectively 
replicated the substance of the FATF Recommendations.’47 The Federation objected to the 
requirement under the Proceeds of Crime Act48 of 2000 to report cash transactions of 
CAN$10,000 or more automatically, but it then adopted in 2004 model rules prohibiting 
lawyers (and Quebec notaries) from processing any cash amount above CAN$7,500.49 The 
Federation further adopted in 2008 rules on client identification and verification that replicate 
the know-your-customer (KYC) requirements contained in FATF standards.50 The KYC 
requirements adopted by the Federation are actually stricter than those of the FATF.51 As 
Ronald MacDonald, then vice president of the Law Societies Federation, explained the 
Federation ‘supports know your client regulation in principle and recognizes it as both 
necessary and appropriate.’52 But, by adopting self-regulatory measures that essentially 
replicate the FATF requirements, legal professionals have ‘eliminated the need for federal 
regulation of the legal profession.’53 At the victorious conclusion of the Federation of Law 
Societies’ case, MacDonald again remarked that the Federation does not have much objection 
to the substance of gatekeeping rules; instead, ‘…all we’re saying is that…in order to protect 
the independence of the bar and solicitor-client privilege … we should be doing it’.54 
In the United States, the ABA took steps to divert the Federal government 
from legislating the FATF standards into domestic law. The ABA established a taskforce to 
follow up on FATF and US government’s policy and devise pre-emptive courses of action. 
Following the work of the task-force, the ABA adopted a Good Practices Guidance 
 
47 Paton, P. D., ‘Cooperation, co-option or coercion? The FATF lawyer guidance and regulation of the legal 
profession’ (2010) Journal of the Professional Lawyer 165 at p.189. 
48 Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (S.C. 2000, c. 17). 
49 Federation of Law Societies of Canada, ‘Model Rule on Cash Transactions’, 2004, available at 
(https://flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/No-Cash-Rule.pdf).  
50 Federation of Law Societies of Canada, ‘Model Rule on Client Identification and Verification’, 2008, 
available at (https://flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Client-Identification-and-Verification-Final-rule-
2Oct2018.pdf).  
51 MacDonald (fn 11 above) p.146. 
52 Ibid, p.150. 
53 Ibid, p.149. 
54 Globe & Mail, ‘Money-Laundering Rules Don’t Apply to Lawyers: B.C. Court’ 30 September 2011 
(https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/the-law-page/money-laundering-rules-
dont-apply-to-lawyers-bc-court/article596286/).  
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document,55 a Formal Opinion on client due diligence,56 and, together with international 
lawyers’ associations, a Lawyers Guide.57 The Good Practices Guidance and Formal Opinion 
463 contained most of the due diligence standards adopted by the FATF;58 some 
representatives of ABA further stated that such standards are in fact already practiced 
informally by lawyers.59 Reports documenting the preparatory history of these self-
governance instruments note that the latter are conceived in response to legislative proposals 
being floated in the US Congress.60 The chairperson of the taskforce, Kevin Shepherd, 
acknowledged that these documents were adopted with the hope that it ‘would obviate the 
need for Congress to enact legislation designed to impose a rules-based system on US 
lawyers.’61 Furthermore, the ABA adopted a resolution explicitly urging Congress to ‘refrain 
from enacting federal legislation that would regulate the legal profession through AML 
initiatives’62 even while endorsing the need for lawyers to undertake customer due diligence 
and other AML/CFT measures.  
In the Canadian and American lawyers’ resistance, the fight for self-
governance is situated within the well-documented tradition of fierce legal professional 
independence in those countries,63 compared to the relatively weak resistance staged by 
European and other (as in Japan and Australia) legal professional associations. Associations 
 
55 ABA, Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2013). 
56 ABA, Formal Opinion 463 (2013) 
(https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/formal_opinion_463.
authcheckdam.pdf).  
57 ABA, IBA, and CBLSE, A Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering (2014). 
58 See, e.g., Formal Opinion 463, para.2; Good Practices Guidance, p.8. 
59 Terrill J.A., and Breslow, M.A., ‘The Role of Lawyers in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing: Lessons from the English Approach’ (2015) 60 New York Law School Law Review 433 at p.436, 
p.441. 
60 Healy, N.M., et al, ‘U.S. and International Anti-Money Laundering Developments’ (2009) 43 International 
Lawyer 795 at p.796. 
61 Shepherd (fn 11 above) at p.98. 
62 ABA, Resolution 300 (11-12 August 2008). 
63 See Kronman, A.T., The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, Cambridge/London: Harvard 
University Press, 1993; Gordon, R., ‘A New Role for Lawyers?; The Corporate Counselor after Enron’ (2002–
2003) 35 Connecticut Law Review 1185; Gordon, R., ‘The Return of the Lawyer-Statesman?’ (2017) 69 
Stanford Law Review 1731. 
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outside of North America took part in the initial resistance to gatekeeping.64 However, their 
resistance largely faded away when met with strong push back from governments and 
judiciaries.65  
The discussion so far shows that institutional factors, namely threats to the 
image and the administration of the legal profession, have fuelled lawyers’ resistance to the 
gatekeeping initiative, lying beneath the official narrative of concern for liberal democracy. 
The self-image of legal professionals as guardians of public interest, and their need for 
administrative independence and self-governance of the profession, meant that both ‘being 
regulated by’ and ‘working for’ the government are anathema – ill-fitting for actors who 
claim to monitor the state’s disciplinary power.  
Implications of institutional consciousness for gatekeeping: banking v. legal 
professionals 
 
Legal professionals’ perception that gatekeeping rules threaten the status and 
self-governance of their profession, particularly within the North American context, affects 
how they apply AML/CFT rules. To see this even more clearly, legal professionals’ 
perception towards gatekeeping can be contrasted with that of another professional group (the 
banking sector). Whereas legal professionals characterize the imposition of gatekeeping 
obligations as intrusive micro-management of the profession by governments, bankers see it 
as a burdensome entrustment of governmental power into their hands. Consequently, lawyers 
demanded greater implementation discretion and less collaboration with the state, while 
bankers pushed for less discretionary power, ever more defined tasks and greater 
collaboration with the state.  
The professional service company, KPMG, undertakes global anti-money 
laundering surveys which provide key sources of insight into the perceptions of financial 
institutions regarding the implementation of AML rules.66 These reports find that banks are 
 
64 Kirby, D., ‘The European Union’s Gatekeeper Initiative: The European Union Enlists Lawyers in the Fight 
Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing’ (2008) 37 Hofstra Law Review 261. 
65 See Ali, N.T., ‘States’ Varied Compliance with International Anti-Money Laundering Standards for Legal 
Professionals’ (2019) 88 Nordic Journal of International Law (forthcoming).  
66 The reports are generally available at the KPMG website (www.kpmg.com). 
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not comfortable when executing their gatekeeping role on a risk-based approach.67 The report 
from 2014 identifies that the top three AML compliance costs for financial institutions are 
automated transaction monitoring systems, KYC exercises (creating, updating, reviewing 
data), and personnel recruitment and retention. This report underscores that risk-based control 
of dirty money is very expensive for banks; other commentators further claim that this regime 
would eventually force ‘second-tier’ banks out of the market.68 
Bankers’ problem with the risk-based approach in gatekeeping is not only its 
cost. The other crucial issue they face is lack of information and fear of exercising their 
independent judgment when the law is ambiguous. The risk-based approach leaves much of 
the information gathering and decision-making work to the ground-level executors, in this 
case banks. Unlike in the case of, for example, international sanctions lists where banks have 
to execute mechanically the freezing of assets of already specified individuals and entities,69 
the risk based approach requires banks themselves to decide when to act –to devise and apply 
various criteria corresponding with the varying degrees of risk posed by their clients.  
Making such lists requires thorough customer due diligence work by banks. In 
doing so, one core element poses a great challenge: identifying beneficial owners. Bank 
officials consistently regard this element as the most difficult task as it is involves complex 
and time-consuming financial intelligence work.70 The key difficulties raised by bankers are 
obtaining adequate information about clients and being able to identify risk and take measure 
against it.71 Assessing risk requires (financial) intelligence on clients and their associations, 
for which banks are furnished less than perfect intelligence from official sources.72 
 
67 In addition, see Gadinis, S. and Mangels, C., ‘Collaborative Gatekeepers’ (2016) 73 Washington & Lee Law 
Review 797. 
68 Simons, E.L., ‘Anti-Money Laundering Compliance: Only Mega Banks Need Apply’ (2013) 17 North 
Carolina Banking Institute 249. 
69 Even then, this involves a degree of human decision-making, e.g. names on sanctions lists have various 
aliases and involve linguistic and cultural insight to identify. E.g. if we enter the name “Sadam Hussein” into the 
Lexis Nexis © WorldCompliance sanctions database, it turns up six aliases and alternative spellings (English 
and Arabic) of the name that are in use.  
70 KPMG International, ‘Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey’ (2014), available at 
(https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/03/global-anti-money-laundering-survey-latest.pdf) (last 
accessed 30 January 2019), p.25. 
71 Ibid., pp.26-27. 
72 See, e.g., UK Law Commission, ‘Anti Money Laundering: the SARs Regime’, Consultation Paper No. 236, 20 July 
2018.  
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Furthermore, in identifying and tackling risk, banks increasingly report that automated risk 
management techniques fail to deliver adequate results. Consequently, banks have to rely 
more on human decision making, which actively positions their personnel on the frontlines of 
interpreting and policing crime.73 Vanessa Iafolla has shown how front-office bank personnel 
engage in empirical and moral judgment starting from the very initial steps of suspicious 
activity report processing, whether by associating certain monetary instruments with 
particular AML/CFT risk or determining customers’ vulnerability to predicate crimes by their 
spending habits and social status.74 The responsibility that comes with such positioning as an 
interlocutor of the AML/CFT regime has often led banks to adopt a de-risking approach, 
which is risk avoidance altogether, instead of risk management, resulting in grave financial 
exclusion consequences on the global poor by disrupting remittances and trade.75  
For both of these informational and risk-management needs, bankers seek the 
state’s close collaboration. The KPMG survey shows that 63 percent of survey respondent 
bankers said that ‘regulators should provide additional guidance’ on how to execute risk-
based AML, and 43 percent indicated that ‘stronger relationship with regulators’ is needed.76 
Yet, this demand goes against the very idea espoused by the risk-based approach of 
devolving decision-making power to local actors. Bankers are, in other words, demanding 
less regulatory responsibility and more detailed guidance from governments. When such 
detailed guidance from governments is not forthcoming, banks resort to a hyper-cautious 
execution of their gatekeeping role.77  
 
73 Ibid.; Isa, Y.M., Sanusi, Z.M., Haniff, M.N., Barnes, P.A., ‘Money Laundering Risk: From the Bankers’ and 
Regulators Perspectives’ (2015) 28 Procedia Economics and Finance 7. 
74 Iafolla, V., ‘The Production of Suspicion in Retail Banking: An Examination of Unusual Transaction 
Reporting’ in King et al. (fn 37 above), pp.81-107. 
75 Stanley, R. L. and Buckley, R. P., ‘Protecting the West, Excluding the Rest: the Impact of the AML/CTF 
Regime on Financial Inclusion in the Pacific and Potential Responses’ (2016) 17 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 83; Ramachandran, V., Collin, M., and Juden, M., ‘De-risking: An Unintended Negative 
Consequence of AML/CTF Regulation’ in King et al., (fn 37 above), pp.237-271. 
76 KPMG International (fn 5670 above), p.36-38. 
77 Dean, A., Thompson, E. and Keatinge, T., ‘Draining the Ocean to Catch one Type of Fish: Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of the Global Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime’ (2013) 7 Perspectives on Terrorism 62; De 
Koker, L. and Jentzsch, N., ‘Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity: Aligned Incentives?’ (2013) 44 World 
Development 267; Davies, H., ‘The Dilemma of Defining Risk Appetite in Banking’ Financial Times 9 
September 2014. 
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This reaction from bankers starkly contrasts with that of lawyers. The latter 
position their profession as a public interest function, and hence in principle have less 
objection to assuming public responsibility. However, due to the institutional factors outlined 
earlier, lawyers object to detailed gatekeeping obligations as if ‘mere businesses’ and to close 
collaboration with the state. Therefore, lawyers have argued for the most expansive 
application of the risk-based approach in executing their gatekeeping role. At times, lawyers 
even explicitly stated their fear of governments imposing ‘bank-style obligations’ on 
lawyers.78 Bankers, on the other hand, perceive the risk-based approach in gatekeeping as a 
burdensome commandeering by the government or being deputized to act in place of the 
government, while they profess to be mere businesses that should only be deployed as 
executors.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This analysis of the legal professionals’ receptivity to the gatekeeping 
obligations shows how the international AML/CFT regime impacts the institutional 
consciousness of its professional interlocutors. In particular, the legal community’s anxiety 
over gatekeeping revolves around the perceived threat to two specific institutional issues: one 
is the position or reputation of legal professionals as public-interest actors, and the other is 
the independence or self-governance of the profession. Consequently, the local reception, 
transposition and implementation of the FATF-led international gatekeeping rules has been 
negotiated and shaped by the legal profession’s exceptional resistance, at least in the US and 
Canada. Elsewhere such strategies have not succeeded. 
This chapter further shows how the institutional impact of the gatekeeping 
initiative is not uniform across professional sectors, as could be gleaned from the contrast 
between legal and banking professionals. While lawyers perceive gatekeeping obligations as 
unwelcome micro-management of the profession, bankers reflect an understanding of 
gatekeeping as an entrustment of public power or deputation into a governmental role, which 
they considered equally unwelcome. Upon realizing that resistance had failed and that 
 
78 Terrill J.A., and Breslow, M.A., ‘The Role of Lawyers in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing: Lessons from the English Approach’ (2015) 60 New York Law School Law Review 433 at p.454. 
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gatekeeping obligations are here to stay, legal professionals advocated for open-ended rules 
that would allow them greater discretion in implementation. Bankers, on the other hand, 
requested that the rules be as detailed as possible so that they, as private actors, bear less 
discretionary responsibility of interpreting a public law.    
In order to enhance collaboration with professional, organized groups such as 
lawyers, therefore, governments and the FATF need to address the fit of new regulatory 
initiatives with the institutional cultures of those professions. In comparing lawyers and 
bankers, we see that lawyers’ institutional consciousness resulted in a resistance to 
gatekeeping regulations that frustrated states’ compliance with FATF standards, whereas 
bankers’ response was an overzealous execution of gatekeeping regulations that resulted in a 
wave of financial exclusion to the global poor. This shows that professional gatekeepers 
indeed act as interlocutors of AML/CFT rules, meaning that they translate and shape the 
regulatory process on the ground, and that in doing so, their institutional context shapes the 
implementation and the consequences of such rules.      
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